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Land Acknowledgement 
 
“I acknowledge Indigenous people as the traditional stewards of the land and the 
enduring relationship that exists between them and their traditional territories. The 
land on which I sit is the traditional unceded territory of the Wampanoag nation 
and I acknowledge their painful history of genocide and forced occupation of their 
territory, I will work to educate myself and others and to speak out against 
injustice. I honor and respect the many diverse Indigenous people connected to this 
land on which I live from time immemorial.” 
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                    ‘Restoring Balance’ - Reconstructing Indigenous Strategies in King Philip’s War 
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
King Philip’s War (1675 – 1678) was one of several "Indian Wars" in 17th-century colonial 
America. It was also referred to as “the first Indian war." However, there had been a previous 
conflict known as The Pequot War (1636 – 1638). Unlike the previous war and unrelated 
skirmishes over the years, King Philip’s War was a regional conflict that quickly spread 
throughout coastal and interior Native homelands in what is now called New England. While 
issues that caused the war built up over decades, the war formally began on the 25th of June,1 
1675, when a band of Pauquunaukit Wampanoag (anglicized as Pokanoket, literally, "land at the 
clearing")2 attacked several isolated homesteads in the small Plymouth colony settlement of 
Swansea.3 Their leader, or Sachem, was a man named Metacom, known as Philip to the English.4 
Metacom was the son of 8sâmeeqan (Ousamequin), more commonly known as Massasoit.5 He 
 
1
 The 25th of June is the date most commonly cited and agreed upon by most scholars of King Philip’s War. 
However, there is some debate over the date, based on a raid on one of Josiah Winslow’s homes which supposedly 
occurred on the 20th of June, and apparent miscommunication between colonial settlements at the outbreak of the 
war.  
2
 The Council of Seven Royal House, Pokanoket Tribe, Pokanoket Nation, https://pokanokettribe.com/  throughout 
this paper, every attempt will be made to acknowledge and refer to the various Native American peoples involved 
using names and terminologies they use to identify themselves and their ancestral lands.  
3
Increase Mather, A Brief History of the Warr With the Indians in New England, 1676, An Online Electronic Text 
Edition, ed. Paul Royster, Faculty Publications, UNL Libraries. 31. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/libraryscience/31 
The reason for this particular citation is to establish the date of the attack on Swansea. This is the most often referred 
to date, but other histories, primarily from secondary sources, give other dates as late as the 29 th of June 1675. 
4 He took the name Philip to honor the relations between the colonists and his father and even purchased European-
style apparel in Boston. Billy J Stratton, Buried in Shades of Night: Contested Voices, Indian Captives, and the 
Legacy of King Philip’s War, (Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 2013) 
5
 The name Massasoit is an Abenaki term that most closely translates to "Great Sachem" Until recent decades, he 
was almost universally referred to by his title as opposed to his actual name. The transliteration of the name as 
8sâmeeqan here is based upon the remarkable work of the Wôpanâak Language Reclamation Project, which began 
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was the same Massasoit who assisted the first English settlers at Plymouth in 1620. While the 
war ended in Southern New England with Philip's death on the 12th of August, 1676, the war 
continued in Northern New England until the Treaty of Casco in April of 1678. King Philip’s 
War was therefore not a localized event like the earlier Pequot War (1636 – 1638). The Pequot 
War served as an example of what the Indigenous nations faced at the hand of the English. In 
that war, the English made no distinction between combatants and non-combatants, as evidenced 
by the Connecticut and Massachusetts Colonies' attack on the Pequot fortified village at Mystic 
on the 26th of May, 1637.6  The Pequot defeat may well have provided food for thought among 
Indigenous nations in the area, and may have catalyzed their commitment towards procuring 
firearms. 7 
Much has already been written about King Philip’s War. Until the 1990s, histories of the war 
focused on battles and their outcomes, derived primarily from primary sources and documents 
that were almost singularly English in origin; as such, they all tended to follow similar plot lines 
and were at times blatantly racist.8 In 1998, Jill Lepore published The Name of War; in this book, 
 
in 1992 as a joint collaborative effort of the Mashpee, Aquinnah, Assonet & Herring Pond Wampanoag 
communities to bring back the Wampanoag ancestral language after 150 years of dormancy (Home | Wôpanâak 
Language Reclamation Project (wlrp.org). 
6
 On the 26th of May, 1637, a force of approximately 90 English and 100 Native allies (Narragansett, Mohegan, 
Niantic, and Connecticut River Indians) attacked and burned the fortified Pequot village of Mistick Fort, killing over 
400 adults and children. Here we see how a name can influence our perceptions. The English referred to this event 
as a battle. Descendants of the Pequot and descendants of the Narragansett, Mohegan, Niantic, and Connecticut 
River Indians refer to it much more correctly as a massacre. *Battlefields of the Pequot War, Mashantucket Pequot 
Museum and Research Center, American Battlefield Protection Program,  
http://pequotwar.org/archaeology/overviewbattle-of-mistic-fort/  
7
 Armstrong Starkey, European and Native American Warfare, 1675 – 1815, (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1998), p. 68. It is also entirely possible, as pointed out by Dr. Kevin McBride, that the primary catalyst was 
the regional inter-tribal conflicts that followed the Pequot War, perhaps as a result of the political/military void left 
by the defeat of the Pequot. However, it is also possible that Native communities also began to acquire firearms in 
anticipation of the conflict with the English they were sure was coming. 
8
 Whether rooted in cultural biases, racial biases, or both, the attitudes towards indigenous people are plain to see in 
the primary sources. For example, in Cotton Mather's work Magnalia Christi Americana, Mather used terms that 
were common at the time: “The time-limited by Heaven for the Succe'ls of the Indian Treacheries was now almoft 
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Lepore looked not just at battle histories but at geographic, political, cultural, and racial aspects 
of the war and how it contributed to the American Identity. Her work marked the beginning of 
historiographic writing that took a deeper look at the war's ethnography. This has been expanded 
on most recently by the writings of James Drake (2000), Lisa Brooks (2018), and Christine 
DeLucia (2018). Authors such as Douglas Edward Leach (1958) and Patrick Malone (1999) have 
also examined how Indigenous nations fought during the war. Guided by their writings and 
revisiting primary sources, a clearer picture can be drawn regarding how Indigenous nations used 
diplomacy, developed alliances, and acquitted themselves far better than the way in which earlier 
historiography portrayed them. The New England commander Benjamin Church wanted his 
army to be, at the very least, twenty-five percent Indigenous.9 Regarding Indigenous use of 
European firearms, Connecticut Deputy Governor William Leete stated that they were "so 
accurate marks men above our men, to doe execution, whereby more of ours are like to fall, 
rather than of theirs, unless the Lord by special providence, do deliver them into our hands.” 10 
Another resource for the study of the war is the archaeological record. Archaeology can tell 
us many things the written records do not. It can verify or even change the accepted views of 
what took place, where it took place, and when. The archaeological work that has been done has 
helped to both verify and bring a more precise picture to the written accounts of the Battle of 
Great Falls / Wissantinnewag – Peskeompskut (the 19th of May, 1676) and the Second Battle of 
Nipsachuck (Battle of Mattity Swamp), the latter of which occurred on the 2nd of July, 1676. 
 
expired: The Blafphemy, and Infolence, and prodigious Barbarity of the Salvages…” Book VII, p. 52, 
https://archives.org/details/magnaliachristia00math 
 
9 Benjamin Church, The History of the Eastern Expeditions, ed. Henry Martyn Dexter (Boston, 1867) p. 133. 
https://archive.org/details/historyofeastern00chur_0  
10
 William Leete, as quoted by Armstrong Starkey in European and Native American Warfare 1675 – 1815, 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), p. 68. 
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Current research at the Battle of Great Falls (Wissantinnewag-Peskeompskut) involves tracing 
the English retreat after their massacre of a nearby Native American village. Using metal 
detectors, GPS, and GIS software, researchers have been able to locate musket balls, horse tack, 
and other artifacts from the battle, and reconstruct many aspects of the battle, including the likely 
routes the English took in their retreat. Collections of dropped, faceted, and impacted musket 
balls of varying calibers were the result of the various  skirmishes and ambushes along a route 
that followed Cherry Rum Brook to the Greene and Deerfield Rivers. The historical narrative of 
the Battle of Great Falls / Wissantinnewag-Peskeompskut came primarily from three sources: 
William Hubbard’s Narrative of the Indian Wars, Increase Mather’s A Brief History of the 
Indian Wars in New England, and "Reverend Stephen Williams Notebook." Hubbard and 
Mather's sources are unclear, but were written during and/or directly after the war, and they 
would have received their information from participants, while Reverend William’s account was 
recorded  some 50 years later, from a series of interviews with Jonathan Wells, who was sixteen 
at the time of the battle. While all three of these accounts reflect the  cultural biases so common 
in English accounts of the period, other sources, as well as the archaeology conducted at Great 
Falls / Wissantinnewag-Peskeompskut have substantiated the general accuracy of their writing.11 
By the Second Battle of Nipsachuck (Battle of Mattity Swamp) on the 2nd of July, 1676, the 
English forces were clearly on the ascendency. The battle  demonstrates Connecticut's aggressive 
actions against the Narragansetts, which began with the Great Swamp Fight/Massacre in 
December of 1675.12 However, it also provides a glimpse into various Indigenous peace 
 
11
 Kevin McBride, David Naumec, Ashley Bissonnette, Noah Feldman, Michael Derderian, Site Identification and 
Documentary Project: The Battle of Great Falls / Wissantinnewag-Peskeompskut, the 19th of May, 1676, 
(Washington D.C.: National Park Service American Battlefield Protection Program, 2017), 75-76. 
12
 While primary sources, such as Hubbard and Church, describe this event as the “Great Swamp Fight,” the event 
consisted of an attack on a village consisting mostly of women and children; while numbers vary wildly, anywhere 
from 300-1,000 non-combatants were either killed in the initial attack, or died from exposure after fleeing the 
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overtures to the English (which I will discuss in the body of the work). Second, Nipsachuk may 
have been an attempt, in part, to derail Native peace overtures, something that echoes in the 
causes of the attack on Wissantinnewag- Peskeompskut two months earlier. 
In the years leading up to  hostilities, many attempts were made by Native leaders  such as 
Metacom to find common ground with the English. They used the English court system to 
address grievances, but rarely met with success. This particular grievance was part of a 
discussion between Metacom and the Deputy Governor of the Rhode Island Colony John Easton. 
According to Easton Metacom stated: “…if 20 of their honest Indians testified that an 
Englishman had done them wrong, it was as nothing; and if but one of their worst Indians 
testified against any Indian or their king when it pleased the English, that was sufficient.” 13  By 
combining historiography and archaeology, this paper will attempt to fully understand Native 
American military and diplomatic strategies during King Philip’s War. These aspects of the war 
have remained obscure for most Americans due in no small part to the paucity of writing 
specifically about Indigenous participants in the war.14  
 
 
 
settlement. As such, the event was re-cast as a massacre, not unlike the attack on Mystic in 1637, following the 
writing of A Eulogy for Philip by William Apess in 1836. 
13 John Easton and Paul Royster (editor), "A Relation of the Indian War, by Mr. Easton, of Rhode Island, 
1675" (1675). Faculty Publications, UNL Libraries. 33. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/library science 33.  
14
 Lisa Brooks points to the dichotomy in Mary Rowlandson's stories, an English captive of the Nipmucs, and James 
Printer, a Wampanoag scholar. Printer attended the Harvard Indian College and later became a printer. It was Printer 
who produced John Eliot's translation of the King James Bible into the Algonquian language. Printer was a crucial 
player in the negotiations for the release of Rowlandson, and Brooks mentions that had it not been for Printer's skill 
as a negotiator and a printer, Rowlandson's story may never have come to light. "Rowlandson's prominence and 
Printer's near absence in early American literature, and the historical reality of their intertwined lives may 
metaphorically reflect the relationship between American literature and Native American history." From "Turning 
the Looking Glass on King Philip's War: Locating American Literature in Native Space, American Literary History, 
History, Historicism, and Historiography, Winter 2013, V. 25, n. 4 
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Restoring Balance – Indigenous Strategies in King Philip’s War 
 
Chapter 2 - Methodology 
The overarching objective of this thesis is to create a comprehensive research project on King 
Philip’s War (1675-77), with a distinct focus on Indigenous strategies and tactics, both military 
and diplomatic, and which attempts to show that Indigenous strategies during the war were far 
more complex, effective, and far-reaching than is indicated by the Eurocentric viewpoint 
reflected in  English primary sources. This thesis incorporates three complementary 
methodologies – historical research, archaeological research, and ethnographic research – to 
incorporate the Indigenous history of the war and its aftermath. These main objectives are met 
through the completion of a series of scaffolded sub-goals, including, but not limited to: 
 
1) Incorporating Indigenous analysis of the war through ethnographic research with 
members of the Aquinnah and Mashpee Wampanoag tribes, including Darius Coombs 
(Director of Wampanoag and Eastern Woodlands Interpretation & Research at Plimoth 
Plantation, Mashpee Wampanoag) and Kerri Helme (Guest Experience Manager for the 
Wampanoag Homesite at Plimoth Plantation, Mashpee Wampanoag). 
2) Broadening our understanding of King Philip’s War through archaeological research, 
including interviews with archaeologists, research of archaeological reports in state site 
files, observation of archaeological fieldwork with Dr. Kevin McBride of the University 
of Connecticut and his team at the Great Falls (Wissantinnewag-Peskeompskut) Project 
of the ABPP (American Battlefield Protection Program), and observations from monthly 
meetings of the Grant Advisory Board in Montague, Massachusetts. 
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3) Reexamine the war from a broader perspective that includes the Indigenous history of 
the war, with particular attention given to the fighting tactics and efforts at diplomacy on 
the part of the Indigenous people involved in the war. 
 
As mentioned above, this thesis will draw on three separate but related disciplines: history, 
archaeology and ethnography. 
I. History 
 In recent decades, writers such as Jill Lepore (1998), James Drake (1999), Lisa Brooks 
(2018), Christine DeLucia (2018), and others, have re-examined the war with an emphasis on 
ethnohistory; the branch of anthropology concerned with the history of peoples and cultures, 
especially non-Western ones. In a review of her book, Our Beloved Kin, Jon Parmenter wrote: 
“Brooks demonstrates that by examining overlooked primary documents, emphasizing 
previously neglected personalities, and detailing events-as-lived, [Brooks] provides a deeper 
understanding of Indigenous “strategies and logics,” which in turn can tell us much of value that 
is new. 15 This idea is the inspiration for this paper - the idea that we can reexamine historical 
events by looking at overlooked or underused sources and a new, more accurate understanding of 
past events can come to light. Bringing the disciplines of archaeology and ethnography further 
enhances this practice. A primary source that has influenced a great deal of  scholarly research 
over the years is The Sovereignty and Goodness of God by Mary Rowlandson. Rowlandson’s 
book was first published in Boston in 1682. It has been called America’s “First Best Seller.” 
Rowlandson, albeit inadvertently, created the framework for a whole genre of literature, the 
 
15
 Jon Parmenter, book review in Ethnohistory, (2019), 66, no. 4, pp. 755-756 https://doi.org/10.1215/00141801-
7683402  
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captivity narrative. A close examination of her writing has provided some of the best available 
information about the Pocasset Sunksqua 16 Weetamoo. 
Revisiting Rowlandson’s narrative also provides glimpses into how an English colonial 
woman viewed the world. Much of the primary sources which had been relied upon for such a 
long time regarding the war are official writings such as court proceedings and the histories from 
people such as William Hubbard, Cotton Mather, Increase Mather, and Daniel Gookin.  These 
histories were written not only from the perspective of a European male, but males who were all 
Puritan ministers. These sources, and those that were produced in the decades and centuries after 
the war, often contain the biases, prejudices, and perspectives that existed in the time the works 
were produced. Indigenous people  are often referred to as “savages” and “heathens.” A more 
complete narrative of the war and its effects on all involved begins to take shape by: 
● Revisiting the historiography of the war, including narratives from Indigenous 
written sources such as the letter from James the Printer. 
● Reviewing the official records of Plymouth Colony from the Massachusetts State 
and Plymouth County Archives. 
● Combining the study of these histories with archaeological and ethnographic 
research. 
 
16 Sunksqua is an Algonquian word that combines the words “sunk” meaning elevated and the word “squa” meaning 
woman and it refers to a Native woman who serves as a sachem or chief. It can also indicate the wife of a chief. 
Traditionally, among eastern Algonkian peoples, it was common for women as well as men to serve as chiefs. 
Female leaders were also called, by the English squaw sachem. This term was often misinterpreted by colonial 
leaders, whose gender-based preconceptions led them to falsely believe that the term simply referred to a sachem’s 
wife, with no significant political power. http://1704.deerfield.history.museum>popups>glossary  
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II.         Archaeology  
In order to incorporate the archaeology of King Philip’s War in order to supplement the 
information provided in various historical narratives, I reviewed archaeological state site files 
and other sources at the Massachusetts Historical Commission, the Rhode Island Historic 
Preservation and Heritage Commission, Plimoth-Patuxet (formerly Plimoth Plantation), and local 
libraries in Cumberland, RI; Smithfield, RI; South Kingstown, RI; and other locations. In 
addition, I journeyed to numerous meetings of the Grant Committee Advisory Board, held 
monthly in Montague, at which were discussed issues of signage, funding, and updated 
battlefield reports from Dr. McBride.17 I was also able to travel to two seperate locations and 
witness the ongoing work of the battlefield archaeology survey establishing the English routes of 
retreat by searching for musket balls and any other battle-related artifacts in the areas with Dr. 
McBride. To obtain a better understanding of the period, I traveled to the Mashantucket Pequot 
Museum and Research Center in Mashantucket, Connecticut on several occasions, including one 
in September 2019, in which the museum sponsored a weekend of live displays with period 
reenactments of wampum and projectile point production, along with early colonial industry. A 
visit to Jade Luiz, curator at Plimoth-Patuxet provided a chance to view artifacts such as 
weapons and armor used by English forces during the time period (see fig. 6 app. II). 
 
17
 The Battlefield Grant Advisory Board — composed of Jonathan Perry, (now former) Deputy THPO for the 
Aquinnah Wampanoag; Liz Coleman of the Chaubunagungamaug Band of Nipmuc Indians (filling in for Vice 
Chairman David Tall Pine White); Roger Long Toe Sheehan, Chief of the Elnu Abenaki; Doug Harris, the Deputy 
THPO of the Narragansett; and David Brule of the Nolumbeka Project, as well as historical commissioners from 
Montague, Greenfield, Gill, Northfield and Deerfield - is an advisory board created to manage and oversee the 
National Parks Service American Battlefield Protection Program Grant awarded in accordance with 54 U.S.C. 
380101-380103. 
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III.     Ethnography 
         Formal and informal discussions with numerous members of the Aquinnah and Mashpee 
Wampanoag Nations took place throughout the study period. The comments of those who chose 
to go on the record and sign Bridgewater State University IRB Informed Consent forms are 
formally referenced in the chapter on the ethnography of the war. These individuals include 
Darius Coombs (Director of Wampanoag and Eastern Woodlands Interpretation & Research at 
Plimoth Plantation, Mashpee Wampanoag) and Kerri Helme (Guest Experience Manager for the 
Wampanoag Homesite at Plimoth Plantation, Mashpee Wampanoag). These interviews provided 
important information on Indigenous histories of the war, including the buildup to the war, the 
causes of the war, strategies and tactics during the war, the complexities of Indigenous social 
structures at the time, the war’s aftermath, and the continuing effects of the war and settler 
colonialism on Indigenous sovereignty. 
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Restoring Balance – Indigenous Strategies in King Philip’s War 
 
Chapter 3 – Warfare 
 
The pre-contact Indigenous world was not the bloodthirsty “howling wilderness” that 
existed in the imaginations of early European colonists, nor was it the “Paradise lost” where 
people existed in a kind of Edenic bliss. Archaeological, osteological, and ethnohistoric accounts 
exist of warfare reaching back thousands of years and these records can be found throughout the 
major Indigenous cultural areas of North America.18 Methods and reasons for fighting were 
influenced by environmental conditions, cultural norms, and the specifics of Indigenous polities 
across the wide spectrum of tribal or group affiliations. The colonial powers lacked an 
understanding of political and cultural complexities in the Indigenous world and often took a 
dismissive view of Indigenous cultural norms relying instead on European beliefs, ideas, and 
thoughts concerning the nature of violence and the conduct of war.19 
A brief note on Strategy versus tactics. Both terms originated as military terminology. 
The strategies being examined are overall war aims and overall diplomatic aims. How the war 
was fought, attacks, raids, ambushes and such, fall under tactics. The overall strategic goal was 
to drive the English out of Indigenous lands.  
 
18
 Richard J. Chacon and Rubén G. Mendoza, North American Indigenous Warfare and Ritual Violence, Chacon 
and Mendoza, eds. (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2007), pp. 5, 229-230. 
19
 David H. Dye and M. Franklin Keel, “The Portrayal of Native American Violence and Warfare: Who Speaks for 
the Past?”, in The Ethics of Anthropology and Amerindian Research, Richard T. Chacon and Rubén Mendoza, eds. 
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2007), p.52 
15 
 
 
The environment was an obvious factor in Indigenous warfare tactics in the northeast 
portion of the Eastern Woodlands area.20 The tactics developed by Indigenous people over the 
millennia, referred to derisively by early European colonists as “skulking,” combined with the 
acquisition of European firearms, made the Indigenous participants in King Philip’s War 
formidable fighters. Daniel Gookin, a soldier and thirty-year Superintendent of Indigenous 
Affairs for the Colony of Rhode Island, wrote:  
“But it was found another matter of thing than expected; for our men could see no 
enemy to shoot at, but yet felt their bullets out of the thick bushes where they lay in 
ambushments. The enemy also used this stratagem, to apparel themselves from the waist 
upwards with green boughs, that our Englishmen could not readily discern from the 
natural bushes; this manner of fighting our men had little experience of, and hence were 
under great disadvantage.”21 
From the late Fall of 1675 until March of 1676, the English were at a loss to counter the 
guerilla [skulking] tactics of their Indigenous enemies unless they had their Mohegan and Pequot 
allies with them. The English forces22 repeatedly wandered into ambushes at bridge crossings, 
 
20
 The Woodland Cultural area is the area of North America that extends eastward from the Mississippi River 
Valley East. It encompasses the area as far north as southern Canada and as far south as southernmost Florida. 
21
 Daniel Gookin, An Historical Account of the Doings and Sufferings of the Christian Indians in the Years 1675, 
1676, 1677, in Archaelogica Americana, Transactions and Collections of the American Antiquarian Society II, 
(Cambridge, 1836) p. 441. 
22
 It is worth clarifying that Connecticut troops immediately embraced alliances with the Pequot, Mohegan and 
others as allies at the start of the war, and thus were a more-or-less effective fighting force throughout the war. The 
Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay Colonies did not take advantage of possible Indigenous allies, and suffered greatly 
during the war as a result. 
16 
 
 
bends in the road, and trails that were flanked with reeds, brush, and forest. These kinds of 
attacks by the Indigenous forces resulted in the deaths of hundreds of militiamen.23  
Colonial documents and twentieth century historical research based on those documents 
generally assumed that Indigenous warriors were not dependable soldiers. According to these 
documents, “savages committing brigandage,” while using “primitive” methods of warfare, 
sought mainly to wreak vengeance and achieve glory. These pejorative terms were common 
judgments in the colonial records and, until quite recently, in much of historiography.”24 
Reasons for Indigenous people engaging in warfare also differed from European 
rationales. Indigenous intersocietal conflict emphasized bravery and war honors through 
individual combat, rather than conquest and mass body counts.25 According to Roger Williams: 
“… Their Warres are farre lesse bloudy and devouring then the cruell Warres of Europe; 
and seldome twenty slaine in a pitcht field: partly because when they fight in a wood every Tree 
is a Bucklar [shield]. When they fight in a plaine, they fight with leaping and dancing, that 
seldome an Arrow hits, and when a man is wounded, unlesse he that shot followes upon the 
wounded, they soone retire and save the wounded: and yet having no Swords, nor Guns, all that 
are slaine are commonly slain with great Valour and Courage: for the Conquerour ventures into 
the thickest, and brings away the Head of his Enemy26 
 
The stereotype of a “skulking” pattern of war is based on persistent small, partisan raids, 
often without the consent or knowledge of a polities’ formal political structure or sanctioning 
 
23
 Julie A. Fisher and David J. Silverman, Ninigret, Sachem of the Niantics and Narragansetts: Diplomacy, War, 
and the Balance of Power in Seventeenth-Century New England and Indian Country, (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2014), p. 128. 
24
 Leroy V. Eid, “National” War Among Indians of Northeastern North America,” Canadian Review of American 
Studies, 16, no. 2 (Summer 1985), p. 126 
25
 While accurate on a general level, this is also very much an over-simplification of Indigenous conflict during the 
Contact period. While kin-based intermittent conflict characterized by raids and counter raids was common, there 
are indications that there was something else going on as well - otherwise why would almost  every native 
community have a palisaded fort – in some cases prior to European contact? The Pequot and Mohegan, for example, 
at the time of King Philip’s War, were fighting against their traditional enemies and according to their cultural ethos. 
26
 Roger Williams, A Key into the Language of America: or An help to the Language of the Natives in that part of 
America called New England, Intro. Howard M Chapin, (Bedford, Ma.: Applewood Books, 1997) pp. 188-9.  
17 
 
 
councils. However, in the case of King Philip’s War and Indigenous warfare in the northeast 
region in general, these raids were always sanctioned, as they could eventually involve the entire 
community. These raids usually involved small bands of ten or fewer individuals.27 
[It is important at this point to distinguish amongst the tactics Indigenous forces were using. As 
Eid has pointed out, “at certain decisive times the Indians were able to coalesce into impressively 
large and successful armies that could perform well in large-scale conflicts.”28 While the raids 
against colonial towns were conducted as small scale operations, the need for a larger organized 
force was seen by people, particularly Metacom, who spent a great deal of time creating alliances 
with various groups among the Wampanoag, Narragansett, and Nipmuc nations.  
As trade expanded between Indigenous nations and European colonists, the former 
acquired firearms at a rapid pace following the Pequot War. Indigenous fighters combined their 
speed and stealth with the weapon's power, adjusting quickly to European-style warfare, while 
still maintaining the methods which they had employed in inter-tribal warfare for millennia, 
knowing very well how to counter English weapons and tactics. With regards to the adapting of 
European firearms, Connecticut Deputy Governor William Leete stated they were “so accurate 
marks men above our own men, to doe execution, whereby more of ours are like to fall, rather 
than of theirs, unless the Lord by special providence, do deliver them into our hands.” 29  
The bow and arrow had a superior rate of fire to the flintlock and muskets of 17th century 
manufacture, but the firearm allowed for a more direct path towards the target. Both weapons kill 
 
27
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at a distance, but the bow and arrow were more limited in range (ca. 60 yards) than muskets and 
flintlocks (ca. 100 yards, except in the case of scattershot). The bow and arrow relies on a more 
indirect arc making it susceptible to deflection from branches and brush, whereas the heavy lead 
projectile fired from a firearm traveled much faster and was less susceptible to deflection from 
light interference such as a branch.30 In close quarter combat, the firearm could be loaded with 
multiple smaller projectiles to produce a greater probability of hitting one or more targets with a 
single discharge (i.e. “scattershot”). This practice is also reflected in the archaeological record, as 
patterns of small caliber musket balls which displayed facets from being jammed together in the 
barrel during firing were found at Wissatinnewag-Peskeompskut by Dr. Kevin McBride. The 
English saw how quickly the Native people adapted to the firearms and how proficient they were 
in their use and began to create laws and issue proclamations banning the sale or trade of 
weapons to the Indigenous peoples, despite technically being at peace with local Indigenous 
nations. This further indicates that the state of relations between English colonists in the region 
and local Indigenous nations was not one of peace, but of settler colonialists attempting to assert 
their dominance over an Indigenous population. Indigenous communities quickly overcame this 
problem by trading with the Dutch to the south and the French in the north who had no such 
restrictions and were undoubtedly happy with the fact these weapons were going to make it 
harder on their English competitors. They also learned to disregard the matchlock which, while 
inexpensive, relied on a lighted match that proved nearly useless in wet weather. The glow of the 
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match was not conducive to remaining concealed in the dense underbrush and wooded areas 
where they preferred to fight. 31 
Gookin described New Englanders at the start of King Philip's war as making "a nothing 
of the Indians ... many reckoned it was no other but Veni, vidi, vici." However, the English 
quickly "found another manner of thing than was expected ... [for they] could not discern or find 
an enemy to fight with yet were galled by the enemy." Indeed, Gookin went on to claim that only 
"after our Indians went out, the balance turned of the English side." For God allowed, said 
Gookin, a few (comparatively) of naked men to do what "numbers of men well-armed and 
provided, endowed with courage and valor" could not. Gookin noted the discipline of the 
Indigenous soldiers, their ability to remain quiet and move stealthily across the terrain. 32 
Indigenous warriors often attacked settlements at dawn while most people were either 
still asleep or just beginning their day. People in this situation would be at their most vulnerable 
and therefore attacks during this portion of the day would have a greater chance for success. 
Metacom’s  forces often attacked towns at dawn, pinning defenders down in garrisons and 
blockhouses while they burned everything down. As mentioned above, this tactic was employed 
as an overall strategy to erase colonists’ connection to the land and deny them their place in the 
region, as addressed above on page 15 of the thesis. In the three-month period of January to 
March 1676, eight towns, Medfield, Weymouth, Warwick, Marlborough, Rehoboth, Swansea, 
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Providence, and Groton were destroyed.33 Mary Rowlandson’s account of her captivity provides 
great detail into how these raids occurred: 
“Their first coming was about sun-rising. Hearing the noise of some guns we looked out; 
several houses were burning and the smoke ascending to heaven…The Indians getting up on the 
roof of the barn, had advantage to shoot at them over their fortification.” Describing the attack on 
her own home Rowlandson related that “The house stood upon the edge of a hill; some of the 
Indians got behind the hill, others onto the barn, and others behind anything that would shelter 
them; from all which places they shot against the house…they had been about the house before 
they prevailed to fire it, which they did with flax and hemp which they brought out of the 
barn…[they] fired it once, and one [colonist] ventured out and quenched it, but they quickly fired 
it again, and that took.”34 
The tactics and weapons employed by the Indigenous combatants in southern New 
England certainly could have led to much larger losses for the English had the Indigenous 
fighters chosen a more unrestricted form of warfare. The attacks on the towns can be seen as a 
continuation of Indigenous warfare that had existed long before European contact. Raids were a 
means to obtain needed supplies, while at the same time denying the opposition of those same 
supplies. Hostages were often taken as bargaining chips and even adoption into the tribal group. 
The “skulking” way the Indigenous forces fought was natural for them. Relying heavily on 
hunting required the skills needed to stalk, advance on, and dispatch the quarry as quickly and 
efficiently as possible. Whether hunting deer or humans, the same methods apply. As previously 
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discussed, contemporaries such as Daniel Gookin, Roger Williams, and William Harris saw the 
Indigenous tactics as superior to the English methods of open combat and the English saw their 
greatest successes against the Indigenous forces when they employed Indigenous allies and 
similar Indigenous tactics themselves. 
Both English and Indigenous communities toiled to maintain their food supplies during 
wartime, and both targeted foodstuffs of the enemy as a military strategy. Both Indigenous and 
English forces targeted foodstuffs as a military strategy—which is why both sides had to 
repeatedly forage for corn, which then allowed for the tracking of troop movements. For 
example, Indigenous forces which had originally retreated to Wissantinnewag-Peskeompskut 
returned to Nipsachuck (Matitty Swamp) to obtain food stores which had been hidden there. It 
was these troop movements which allowed the English forces to ambush them there. The Winter 
of 1675 - 1676 was one of  “severe hunger and famine” for both colonial and Indigenous 
communities.35 Targeting the enemies’ crops and animals formed an integral component of 
military planning for both sides. After the Lancaster strike, Rowlandson described “the waste” 
the Indians made “of Horses, Cattle, Sheep, Swine, Calves, Lambs, Roasting Pigs, and Fowls . . . 
some roasting, some lying and burning, and some boyling to feed our merciless Enemies.” 36 
Livestock also symbolized the “relentless advance of English settlements” and became targets of  
Indigenous anger and frustration. 37In keeping with contemporary practice, Indigenous fighters 
butchered and ate what they could carry, and maimed or killed outright what they could not. 
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Crops, too, drew the attention of belligerents. During Rowlandson’s seventh remove, Indigenous 
forces “spread themselves over the deserted English fields, gleaning” the wheat, corn, and 
groundnuts.  
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Restoring Balance – Indigenous Strategies in King Philip’s War 
 
Chapter 4 - Diplomacy 
 
Metacom most likely saw an untenable situation in front of him. Much of the land of 
which his people were stewards under his father 8sâmeeqan and his brother, Wamsutta, was 
gone, and these once sizable lands continued to shrink. Metacom assumed power after the death 
of his brother Wamsutta known by the colonists as Alexander. Both Metacom and Wamsutta’s 
wife, Weetamoo, believed Wamsutta had been poisoned at the hands of Plymouth Colony 
officials when he became ill and died shortly after his release by colonial officials, the same 
officials who had marched him from his home at gunpoint a few days earlier for questioning in 
Plymouth.38 
Metacom, who was Pokanoket, gained respect among other Wampanoag nations, such as 
the Sakonnet under Weetamoo, the Pocasset under Quaiapen, and the Nemasket under 
Tuspaquin. He did this by striking against external enemies, entering strategic marriages, 
engaging in regional diplomacy, and as he was willing to take a confrontational stance against 
the English. Metacom built alliances by drawing off disenfranchised tribute payers from the 
Narragansetts, strengthening his kinship ties with the Nipmuc, and developing relationships with 
Eastern Narragansett Sachems whose power had waned, while Ninigret, the leader of the 
Niantics and Western Narragansett, also saw his power increase.39 Metacom was drawing the 
Narragansetts into his orbit after a schism that began in the first decades of the 17th century. 
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Under Canonicus and Miantonomi, the Narragansetts had tried to dominate the Wampanoag 
communities who had been decimated by disease. 8sâmeeqan and his people had been driven 
from the head of Narragansett Bay eastward into the Mt. Hope peninsula. This Narragansett 
aggression led to 8sâmeeqan’s alliance with the Plymouth Bay Colony in 1621.40  
In May of 1666, Philip reached out to the Mauntauketts of Long Island to wrest them 
away from Ninigret who had forced them to pay tribute. Philip sent a letter to the Mauntauketts 
in English, written by his English educated Massachusett scribe, John Sassamon. He then tried to 
gain influence over the Nipmuc of the Quantisset community located in the Quinebaug River 
Valley. The Quantisset Nipmuc were tributaries to Quaiapin, Ninigret’s sister and a Narragansett 
Sachem (Sunksquaw) in her own right. Metacom promised them a tribute free alliance. Ninigret 
and Quaiapin ended that idea by sending hundreds of her people on a bloodless but destructive 
raid on the Quantisset ending Metacom’s attempts at an alliance.41 
 In the days prior to the attack on Swansea, John Easton, then the Deputy Governor of 
Rhode Island, met with Philip to discuss ways to avoid a war that was being seen as increasingly 
unavoidable by both sides. While Easton’s mission was to avoid war, Philip insisted on using the 
opportunity to air the many grievances he and his people harbored. A full relation of Philip’s 
grievances to Easton may be found in Appendix 1 of this thesis. In his Relation of the Indian 
War,  Easton wrote: 
 “…but Philip charged it to be dishonesty in us to put off the hearing of their 
complaints; and therefore, we consented to hear them. They said they had been the first in 
doing good to the English, and the English the first in doing wrong; they said when the 
English first came, their kings’ father [Ousamequin] was as a great man and the English 
as a little child. He constrained other Indians from wronging the English and gave them 
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corn and showed them how to plant and was free to do them any good and had let them 
have 100 times more land than now the king had for his own people.” 42 
 
Easton’s Relation of the Indian War begins with a retelling of the circumstances, to the 
degree they were known, surrounding the death of a Christianized Massachusett named John 
Sassamon in “the Winter of 1674.” He recounted the story of the coroner’s inquest, the arrest, 
conviction and subsequent execution of three Wampanoags for Sassamon’s murder. Although it 
is satisfying to tie the cause of the war to the death of one man, its broader origins remained 
rooted in issues connected to disease, trade, land, migration, and shifting alliances. It was a 
contributing factor, but the movement and planning for war was already well underway. 
Sassamon had been an interpreter for Metacom, but Metacom had come to distrust him because 
of his close ties with Colonial authorities.43  
After the Pokanoket Wampanoag attack on Swansea in late June 1675, Metacom’s forces 
fled to the territories of the Sakonnet Wampanoag, led by the Sunksquaw Awashonks and the 
Pocasset Wampanoag territory led by the Sunksquaw Weetamoo. Had Plymouth ceased its 
pursuit and attempted to negotiate with the Sakonnet and the Pocasset, they may have weakened 
Metacom. Instead, they pursued Metacom’s people into Sakonnet and Pocasset territory thus 
pushing those Wampanoags into Metacom’s ranks.44 
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In the Fall of 1675, Plymouth enslaved over two hundred Wampanoag noncombatants 
who had surrendered to them. At the same time, English colonists in the upper Connecticut River 
Valley demanded that the “Friend Indians” who had previously fought with the English against 
the Nipmuc surrender their guns. This drove the River people into an alliance with Metacom. 
The overbearing tactics of the English, along with Metacom’s multi-tribal diplomacy, turned the 
English fears of a pan-Indian uprising into a reality.45   
Similar to  what often occurred in Europe, marriage was a way to both create and shore 
up alliances. In August of 1675, the Narragansetts, against their agreement with the English, took 
in Weetamoo and approximately 100 of her people. Either just before or just after this event 
Weetamoo married the Narragansett Sachem Quinnapin,46 the nephew of Narragansett Sachem 
Canonicus. Weetamoo was already regarded as a powerful Wampanoag leader and the widow of 
Metacom’s brother Wamsutta. This development put the Narragansett into a commitment to 
defend her people.47 
As the year 1675 turned into 1676, the Indigenous forces had acquitted themselves very 
well. Many were not ready to give up the fight. After a Coalition raid on the town of Medfield, 
Massachusetts, on February 21, 1676, a note was found pinned to a bridge post which said: 
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“ Know by this paper, that the Indians that thou hast provoked to wrath and anger will 
war this 21 years if you will. There are many Indians yet. We come 300 at this time. You must 
consider the Indians lose nothing but their life. You must lose your fair houses and cattle.” 48 
At the same time, diplomatic overtures were being conducted by both sides. The colony 
of Connecticut for example was engaged in diplomacy with the coalition forces assembled at 
Peskeompskut, a situation that may have been a reason why Coalition guards were so few on the 
morning of May 16 allowing the attack on Peskeompskut  to be carried out with surprise. 
Their “skulking way of war” and raids on numerous towns were increasing the level of 
fear and desperation on the part of the English. But it was coming at a cost. Disease, exposure, 
and lack of adequate food were taking a huge toll on both sides. Connecticut had been harassing 
the Narragansett steadily since the massacre in the Great Swamp in December of 1675.49 This 
drove survivors into the interior with many of them joining other displaced groups living in and 
around the Nipmuc villages of Wissantinnewag and Peskeompskut located in the modern-day 
town of Gill, Massachusetts.50  
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Restoring Balance – Indigenous Strategies in King Philip’s War 
 
Chapter 5 – The Archeology of King Philip’s War 
 
Archaeology is, according to Neusius and Gross, “the study of past human behavior and 
culture through the analysis of material remains.”51 This is a good description of archaeology’s 
primary role as one of the four main subdisciplines of anthropology, but it is incomplete.  
Archaeology also has an important role to play in historical research. It can provide insight and 
answer questions about events that may or may not be found in the historical (written) record. It 
can verify or challenge existing narratives. One focus of this paper is on Indigenous fighting 
strategies as they pertained to King Philip’s War, and, in this case, battlefield archaeology has 
provided some valuable information. Battlefield Archaeology as the title implies is concerned 
with the identification and study of sites where conflicts took place and identifying 
archaeological data for analysis. While information can, and should be, obtained from historical 
records associated with the battlefield/event, the archaeology of a battlefield allows battlefield 
historians and archaeologists to reconstruct and assess the veracity of these historical accounts, 
and to fill any gaps in the historical record. Battlefield archaeology can provide not only a 
reconstruction of the event, but it can provide a more dynamic interpretation of the battlefield.52 
Incorporating archaeology also helps us to engage in the process of decolonizing history, 
particularly as it relates to King Philip’s War and other Indigenous-Colonial conflicts. The 
colonial powers lacked an understanding of political and cultural complexities in the Native 
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American world and often took a dismissive view of Indigenous cultural norms, relying instead 
on European beliefs, ideas, and thoughts concerning the nature of violence and the conduct of 
war.”53 
Poly-communal Archaeology 
Twenty-first century archaeologists face two practical challenges:  decolonizing a 
discipline deeply rooted in the colonial worldview and engaging with descendent communities 
about the meaning, value, and treatment of their heritage sites. In North America, much of the 
research about pre- and post-contact Indigenous peoples has marginalized and erased them from 
history and from the present day. This is due in large part to the relegation of Indigenous peoples 
to “prehistoric” periods, particularly here in the Northeast. An overwhelmingly Euroamerican 
narrative emerged after initial colonization, and research questions and methodologies that did 
not require (in the minds of researchers) “seeing” Native peoples as agents in the past or the 
present. This is particularly problematic in the New England region of the Northeastern United 
States which has a longer colonial history than many other regions of the continent, a longer 
history of archaeological practice than elsewhere in North America, and a “complex 
contemporary social matrix of Native and non-Native communities and institutions.”54 In the 
case of the King Philip’s War research conducted by Dr. Kevin McBride and his team, 
referenced and observed throughout this thesis, Dr. McBride embraces a poly-communal 
approach to archaeological investigation, as developed by Siobhan Hart.55 This approach to 
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archaeology focuses on “building a community of stakeholders - a heritage community - by 
engaging multiple stakeholders in heritage work rooted in place.”56 This is very important, as 
there are often multiple stakeholders with differing motives, agendas, heritages and ideas, and 
therefore require sustained dialogue between stakeholders. Dr. McBride’s work puts this 
approach into practice through regular meetings of the Grant Advisory Board, whose members 
include town historians, archaeologists, and representatives from the Elnu Abenaki, 
Narragansett, Nipmuc, Stockbridge-Munsee Mohican, and Wampanoag of Gay Head/Aquinnah 
tribal nations. 
Battlefield Archaeology 
 
 The discipline of Battlefield Archaeology is concerned primarily with the identification 
and study of sites where conflicts took place, and the archaeological signature of the event. This 
requires gathering information from historical records associated with the battlefield including 
troop dispositions and numbers, the order of battle (command structure, strength and disposition 
of personnel and equipment), as well as any undocumented evidence of an action or battle 
gathered from archaeological investigations. The archaeology of a battlefield allows battlefield 
historians and archaeologists to reconstruct the progress of a battle, assess the veracity of 
historical accounts of the battle, and fill any gaps in the historical record. Battlefield archaeology 
also seeks to move beyond simple reconstruction of the battlefield event and move toward a 
more dynamic interpretation of the battlefield.57 
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“Each action identified in the historical narrative and timeline has a distinct spatial and 
material signature that when correlated with the battlefield timeline can be sequenced in 
time and space. Once the battle actions are arranged in their correct chronological and 
spatial order, a dynamic reconstruction of the battlefield can be achieved.” 58 
 
This approach generally applies to Contact and post-Contact archaeology, as large-scale conflicts 
were incredibly rare in the pre-Contact period, and may not have left behind much evidence in 
the archaeological record. In general, based on archaeological and ethnohistoric documentation, 
only a few warriors would be killed in battle and the majority of prisoners, mainly women and 
children, would be adopted or enslaved. These patterns changed over time and space as 
circumstances demanded, but overall Indigenous warfare prior to European contact did not 
embrace wholesale slaughter like that perpetrated by colonial militias.  Prior to contact, people in 
the Eastern Woodlands used the same arrows, celts, and knives used when hunting, working 
wood, and performing other essential domestic tasks. No unusual skills or special materials were 
necessary to fashion war clubs designed solely for fighting. All of the men were by necessity as 
hunters, proficient in the use of their weapons, making every able-bodied man a potential 
warrior; that is, no special training was necessary. Raiding parties were drawn from the 
inhabitants of local communities; distinctive barracks where soldiers resided and armories where 
weapons were made, repaired, and stored did not exist.59 
Single catastrophic attacks resulting in the deaths of most or all community members 
have not been identified in the Eastern Woodlands. Raids of that kind would have required large 
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groups of warriors to overpower their adversaries, even when surprise was achieved. While such 
massacres leave a distinctive archaeological signature, the likelihood of finding such skeletons is 
low, assuming the attacks took place infrequently and left few, if any, survivors to bury the 
dead.60 
Several years ago, Dr. Kevin McBride from the University of Connecticut and his team 
began conducting archaeological research into the Battle of Great Falls / Wissantinnewag – 
Peskeompskut. This particular battle can be seen as one of the key turning points in the war. The 
Town of Montague, with support of the Historical Commissioners from the Towns of Deerfield, 
Gill, Greenfield, Montague, and Northfield along with representatives from the Elnu Abenaki, 
Narragansett, Nipmuc, Stockbridge-Munsee Mohican, and Wampanoag of Gay Head/Aquinnah 
nations received a Site Identification and Documentation grant (GA-2287-14-012) from the 
National Park Service, American Battlefield Protection Program (NPS ABPP) to conduct a pre-
Inventory Research and Documentation project to identify the likely locations of the King 
Philip‘s War Peskeompskut (Turners Falls) Battlefield and associated sites.61 
The scope of the project was to conduct a battlefield survey to “locate, sequence, and 
document” battlefield actions over a designated area and assess the sites eligibility for listing on 
the National Register of Historic Places.62 
Soldiers, residents and even the clergy in nearby Hadley, Massachusetts had grown 
increasingly frustrated with the recent peace talks between Connecticut, Plymouth, and Coalition 
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members. Many were displaced from battles with Metacom’s men in Greenfield and Deerfield 
and wished to retaliate. After Indigenous warriors raided nearby Hatfield and carried off cattle, 
Captain William Turner, commander of the Hadley garrison, decided to take action despite the 
instructions from his superiors. The English attacked Peskeompskut Village near daybreak 
killing hundreds, some from gunfire and many others from drowning in the Connecticut River as 
they tried to flee. The attack destroyed critical food and military supplies. Coalition forces from 
nearby villages responded and mounted a series of well-planned and well-coordinated 
counterattacks and ambushes against the retreating English. The success of Coalition 
counterattacks is reflected in the English casualty rate of between 45-55 percent (39 killed 29 
wounded) out of an estimated 120-150 soldiers. By day's end, Coalition forces held the 
battlefield and exacted a steep price from the English for their attack on Peskeompskut. 
Nonetheless the battle was the beginning of a process that resulted in the dissolution of the 
Native Coalition. 63 The area of battle stretches for approximately 6.5 miles from the Riverside 
area of Gill, Massachusetts to the Deerfield River Ford at the confluence of the Green and 
Deerfield Rivers in Greenfield.64 Using metal detectors, metal detecting pin pointers, GPS, and 
GIS software, researchers have been able to locate musket balls, horse tack, and other artifacts 
from the battle, and reconstruct many aspects of the battle, including the likely routes the English 
took in their retreat. Collections of dropped, faceted, and impacted musket balls of varying 
calibers tell a story of skirmishes and ambushes along a route that followed Cherry Rum Brook 
 
63
 Kevin McBride, David Naumec, Ashley Bissonnette, Noah Fellman, Technical Report, 1676 Battle of Great Falls 
/ Wissantinnewag-Peskeompskut Site Identification and Evaluation Project Phase II National Park Service American 
Battlefield Protection Program GA-2287-18-007 
64 Dr. Kevin McBride, David Naumec, Ashley Bissonnette, Noah Feldman, Michael Derderian “Site Identification 
and Documentation Project” The Battle of Great Falls / Wissantinnewag-Peskeompskut May 19, 1676, National 
Park Service, American Battlefield Protection Program, Technical Report (GA-2287-16-006), Mashantucket Pequot 
Museum and Research Center, Jan 19, 2017, p. 9. 
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to the Greene and Deerfield Rivers. Some are unmarked and may have been dropped, and some 
are misshapen as the result of an impact, while others are faceted, likely as a result of multiple 
small-caliber musket balls being loaded together and fired in a “scatter shot” fashion, not unlike 
a shotgun (see appendix 2). 
Musket Ball Analysis  
The Contact and post-Contact periods are where battlefield archaeology works best.. 
“Knowing the diameter of a musket ball, we can determine what general type of gun it was used 
with. Being able to identify what it hit puts it in context with the location found. Looking at 
groups of musket balls of the same general sizes and impact patterns can be used to identify site 
features such as tree, rocks, fence rails and so forth. Combining all of this data yields a very 
accurate interpretation of the site.”65 
Five hundred and forty-eight lead musket balls were recovered from the Battle of Great 
Falls battlefield Phase I and Phase II surveys.. Both Indigenous Coalition and English forces 
during the war generally carried similar arms. This makes it difficult to associate the nature and 
distribution of lead shot across the Great Falls battlefield with either Coalition or colonial forces. 
It is also difficult to determine which side fired particular projectiles, or which caliber of firearm 
was used or preferred by either side. Fighting during the Battle of Great Fall was asymmetrical 66 
 
65
 Daniel M. Sivilich, Musket Ball and Small Shot Identification: A Guide, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
2016), 44 – 45. 
66
warfare involving surprise attacks by small, simply armed groups on a nation armed with modern high-tech 
weaponry. 
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and it is entirely possible the battlefield was traversed by various combatants several times, 
making it difficult to attribute lead shot to one side or the other. 67 
In one of the most intriguing reconstructions from the battle, artifacts from the area 
known as Upper Factory Hollow suggest that at least some of the retreating colonial forces came 
under sustained attack from coalition forces resulting in three, possibly four, soldiers being 
unhorsed. The mounted English soldiers ascended the steep slope, known as the Swales, from 
Lower Factory Hollow attempting to escape the Coalition forces in close pursuit. After being 
unhorsed by larger caliber weapons, they were forced to fight from either below or behind their 
fallen horses, as evidenced by the distribution of musket balls and horse tack in the area (see fig. 
2, 3and 4, app. II). What also appears to have been happening is that the Coalition forces closed 
in on them, and fired at them at closer range, using smaller caliber musket balls packed together 
into muskets (see fig. 5, app. II), as evidenced by the presence and distribution of faceted, 
smaller-caliber shot. Remaining evidence of impacted, faceted and dropped musket balls 
indicates a scattered pattern of retreat, as Turner’s soldiers (Turner himself was killed at Green 
River Ford, west of Factory Hollow) panicked and ran. All told, Indigenous coalition forces 
(primarily Narragansett, Wampanoag, Pocumtuc and other valley communities) killed 39 
members of the retreating colonial forces.68 A full listing of the musket balls from Factory 
Hollow may be found in Appendix II. 
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Kevin McBride, David Naumec, Ashley Bissonnette, Noah Fellman, Technical Report, 1 Site Identification and 
Evaluation Project Phase II, p. 10.  
 
68
 Douglas Edward Leach, A Rhode Islander Reports on King Philip’s War: The Second William Harris Letter of 
August 1676, (Providence: The Rhode Island Historical Society, 1963), p. 80. Leach states “Most amazing is the 
general agreement on the number...Harris, Mather, and Hubbard all claim 38 were killed.” Another source put it at 
38 plus Captain Turner. 
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Restoring Balance – Indigenous Strategies in King Philip’s War 
 
Chapter 6 – Ethnography 
 
The Wampanoag people regard this region as the land of the dawn. The name 
Wampanoag means “People of the First Light.”69 Increase Mather, an often-cited primary source 
for King Philip’s War, considered this land “the new English Israel” seated in “these goings 
down of the sun.” 70 These are two very different concepts. Perhaps more than any other single 
item, land sat at the center of the differences that ultimately led to war and the beginning of the 
marginalization and attempted eradication of a way of life.  
In June of 2019, I sat down with Darius Coombs, Director of Wampanoag and Eastern 
Woodlands Interpretation & Research at Plimoth Patuxet, Mashpee Wampanoag, and Kerri 
Helme, Guest Experience Manager for the Wampanoag Homesite at Plimoth Patuxet, Mashpee 
Wampanoag. Both of them shared the history of the war as their history which it is. My 
interview was based on a series of questions regarding the way the war is remembered, the way it 
has been written about, and what they, as Indigenous people wish to add to the lessons learned. 
(see Appendix I for a list of sample questions, as well as other IRB materials, including signed 
informed consent documents) 
Our discussions covered a wide range of issues, including issues dating to before the war, 
which made the war inevitable. In most cases, these same issues were carried into the war and 
 
69
 Nancy Eldredge, Nauset Wampanoag and Penobscot, Who Are the Wampanoag? 
https://www.plimoth.org/learn/just-kids/homework-help/who-are-wampanoag  
70
 Increase Mather, “A Brief History of the Warr with the Indians in New England,” in So Dreadful a Judgement: 
Puritan Responses to King Philip’s War, eds. Richard Slotkin and James K. Folsom, (Middletown: Wesleyan 
University Press, 1978), p. 86. See also Brooks, Our Beloved Kin, p. 11. 
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were amplified by the war’s outcome. Epidemics and disease began before the first permanent 
English settlement in Patuxet, re-named Plimouth by the English in 1620. An outbreak of disease 
began in 1617 and continued until 1619. Coombs suggests that the disease was rat-born and 
made its way to North America on French trading ships that landed in Maine. The footprint of 
the disease suggests to him that it started in Maine and worked its way south into Massachusetts 
and parts of Rhode Island but ended at the edge of Narragansett Bay. Additionally, the Aquinnah 
Wampanoag largely escaped it, as they were separated by the waters of Vineyard Sound. Helme 
pointed to the arrival of zoonotic disease with the arrival of livestock native to Europe, but not to 
North America. Disease, according to Coombs, continued to decimate the Indigenous 
populations. There were smaller outbreaks in 1623 and again in 1630. During the war, disease 
and starvation exacted a much higher toll on the Indigenous nations fighting in King Philip’s war 
than actual combat.  
If you were to attempt to find a single issue that encapsulates almost everything else, it 
would be land. The arrival of people from Europe, first a trickle then as a flood, created a 
demand for it. Concepts of land between the colonists and the Indigenous people could not have 
been more dissimilar. The English “purchased” the land from people who had no understanding 
of frame of reference to discern what was taking place. They learned quickly enough and began 
to use the English court system to try and protect their rights. Indigenous people used their own 
people educated in English ways to help them. People like John Sassamon and James the Printer 
learned to read and write English. They sometimes functioned as scribes for their Sachems. Since 
the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215, the English had very definitive concepts of land and land 
ownership. It was something to be purchased and developed. They erected fences, built 
permanent homes and barns, and forbade anyone to trespass, hunt, or fish upon the land they 
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owned without permission. For the Indigenous people, land is a part of who they are. They come 
from it. They return to it. It is their ancestors. It is sacred. For the Indigenous people, losing 
access to the land resulted in loss of hunting, fishing, and water rights, loss of arable farming 
land. While the English maintained strict control over the land, they had no problem with cattle 
and pigs roaming far and wide, a practice that often resulted in the destruction of Indigenous 
food sources such as clam beds and their own fields of corn. An issue concerning enough that 
Metacom brought it up in his meeting with John Easton just before the outbreak of open 
hostilities.71 
Another issue that is still prevalent today involves identity. I mentioned to Coombs about 
putting the Native American story into the history of America. His comments were enlightening. 
“We are still here,” said Coombs. He was referring to Native Americans identification with their 
tribes and nations. “If you ask me who I am, I will tell you I am Mashpee Wampanoag.” 
America, according to Coombs, is the term given to this part of North America by the colonists. 
Indigenous people were here 12,000 years ago, long before the term existed and to this day they 
identify with their tribal affiliations. It is who they are.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
71
 A lengthy segment of Easton’s A Relation of the War, can be found in appendix I. In it, he listed the many 
grievances Metacom and the indigenous people had. 
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Conclusion 
King Philip’s War ended in Southern New England 345 years ago. The larger regional 
conflict that it ignited continued in Northern New England for decades. What makes this War so 
important for study and understanding is the ripple effect of the war’s end. With that end came 
the end of any possibility, however remote it may have been, of Indigenous Sovereignty. The 
Indigenous people became the “others,” those that needed to be conquered, defeated, forced to 
adopt European ways and the European God. Indigenous survivors of the conflict were forced to 
assimilate or leave. Many more, including Wootonekanuske, the wife of Metacom, along with 
his then 10-year-old son were sold into slavery, sent from their home never to be heard from 
again. The mistreatment of the Indigenous people of North America continued well into the 20th 
century. The actions of the 17th century New England colonies became a template for how the 
Colonial and later United States Governments would treat the myriad Indigenous nations that 
live in North America.  
There is a need to understand our past through the history of all of its participants. A 
multicultural and interdisciplinary examination of events can lead to a view of our past that is 
closer to the actual experienced events, and therefore truer, than those that have been synthesized 
and sanitized by the narratives of the dominant or “victorious” cultures. At the same time, it is 
incumbent on researchers, scholars and all involved, to follow the evidence faithfully and not try 
to force a popular notion that lacks evidence.  
While the name Philip was bestowed by the colonial authorities as a show of respect. 
Metacom was believed to have been given the nickname of “King Philip” by the Puritans, 
because of what they saw as his “haughty mannerisms,” similar to the hated Catholic King Philip 
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II of Spain.72 The first reference to the war as “Philip’s War” does not appear in print until 1716 
when Benjamin Church’s son, Thomas, published his father’s recollections in a book titled 
Entertaining Passages Relating to Philip’s War. This was the same Benjamin Church who, on 
August 12, 1676, led an expedition assembled to search for and locate Metacom. Metacom was 
found in a swamp near modern day Mt. Hope in Rhode Island. A Pocasset Wampanoag named 
John Alderman shot Metacom through the heart ending his life and marking an official end, as 
the colonial authorities saw it, to the war. Tragically, it can also be seen as a symbolic beginning 
to a centuries long struggle for the Indigenous people across North America. In fact, the struggle 
had begun decades earlier. King Philip’s War was an inevitable outcome of that struggle. 
Throughout this research, I have learned much about the man most remembered as King 
Philip. It has also suggested many other avenues of study both directly related to the war and 
some further research into some of the personalities from the war. For me, Metacom is no longer 
an abstraction, someone from long ago. I’ve come to see him as a flesh and blood inspiration. 
The person who stands up and says “enough.” I have learned about the incredible women known 
as Weetamoo. I have learned much about the ongoing struggles of people in my own community. 
I have developed a fuller understanding of how the Indigenous people lived, worked and 
struggled to maintain their footing on the land that was theirs for untold millennia. That struggle 
continues to this day.  
 
 
 
 
72
 King Philip’s War, https://www.warpaths2peacepipes.com/the-indian-wars/king-philips-war.htm  
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Appendix I 
 
Background – A Relation of the Indian War 
 
Approximately one week before the attack on Swansea, Metacom agreed to meet with the Rhode 
Island Colony’s Deputy Governor John Easton The excerpt below is lengthy but it is about as 
close as we can hope to come to hearing Metacom speak and give us his argument for why war 
came.73  
“Then to endeavor to prevent it [war], we sent a man to Philip to say that if he would 
come to the ferry, we would come over to speak with him. About four miles we had to 
come thither. Our messenger came to them; they were not aware of it and behaved 
themselves as furious but suddenly were appeased when they understood who he was and 
what he came for. Philip called his council and agreed to come to us; he came himself 
unarmed and about 40 of his men armed. Then five of us went over; three were 
magistrates. We sat very friendly together. We told him our business was to endeavor that 
they might not receive or do wrong. They said that was well—they had done no wrong, 
the English wronged them. We said we knew—the English said the Indians wronged 
them and the Indians said the English wronged them, but our desire was the quarrel might 
rightly be decided in the best way, and not as dogs decided their quarrels. The Indians 
owned that fighting was the worst way; then they propounded how right might take place, 
we said by arbitration. They said all English agreed against them, and so by arbitration 
they had had much wrong, many miles square of land so taken from them; for English 
would have English arbitrators, and once they were persuaded to give in their arms, that 
thereby jealousy might be removed, and the English having their arms would not deliver 
them as they had promised, until they consented to pay a 100 pounds,74 and now they had 
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 John Easton, “A Relation of the Indian War, by Mr. John Easton, of Rhode Island,” 1675, Paul Royster, ed.  
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/libraryscience/33 This is a modern English language version provided by Paul 
Royster. Royster provides an appendix with the original language. 
74 The reference to the £100 refers to a sequence of events in 1671. In April 1671, Metacom was questioned at 
Taunton, about a possible attack, and he was forced to surrender the weapons that various Wampanoags had secured 
from the English. But Metacom may have used his influence to encourage other tribes in the area to resist. When 
they refused to surrender their arms, the Plymouth Colony made ready for war. A last-ditch effort to forestall 
fighting resulted in a meeting in September 1671, attended by the leaders of Plymouth and the Wampanoags, as well 
as the governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut. Metacom apparently had little choice but to accept the terms 
offered him: to pay a fine of £100 to the colony, to agree to follow the colony's advice before resorting to war or 
selling land, and to accept the authority of royal government and of Plymouth over his tribe. It is quite clear that 
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not so much land or money, that they were as good to be killed as to leave all their 
livelihood. We said they might choose an Indian king, and the English might choose the 
Governor of New York that neither had cause to say either were parties in the difference. 
They said they had not heard of that way, and said we honestly spoke, so we were 
persuaded if that way had been tendered, they would have accepted. We did endeavor not 
to hear their complaints, and said it was not convenient for us now to consider of; but to 
endeavor to prevent war, we said to them when in war against the English blood was spilt 
that engaged all Englishmen, for we were to be all under one king. We knew what their 
complaints would be, and in our colony had removed some of them in sending for Indian 
rulers insofar as the crime concerned Indians’ lives, which they very lovingly accepted, 
and agreed with us to their execution, and said so they were able to satisfy their subjects 
when they knew an Indian suffered duly, but said in whatever was only between their 
Indians and not in townships that we had purchased, they would not have us prosecute, 
and that they had a great fear lest any of their Indians should be called or forced to be 
Christian Indians. They said that such were in everything more mischievous, only 
dissemblers, and that then the English made them not subject to their own kings, and by 
their lying to wrong their kings. We knew it to be true, and we promising them that 
however in government to Indians all should be alike and that we knew it was our king’s 
will it should be so, that although we were weaker than other colonies, they having 
submitted to our king to protect them, others dared not other- wise to molest them; so 
they expressed that they took that to be well, that we had little cause to doubt but that to 
us under the king they would have yielded to our determinations in whatever any should 
have complained to us against them; but Philip charged it to be dishonesty in us to put off 
the hearing of their complaints; and therefore we consented to hear them. They said they 
had been the first in doing good to the English, and the English the first in doing wrong; 
they said when the English first came, their king’s father was as a great man and the 
English as a little child. He constrained other Indians from wronging the English and 
gave them corn and showed them how to plant and was free to do them any good and had 
let them have a 100 times more land than now the king had for his own people. But their 
king’s brother, when he was king, came miserably to die by being forced into court and, 
as they judged, poisoned. And another grievance was if 20 of their honest Indians 
testified that a Englishman had done them wrong, it was as nothing; and if but one of 
their worst Indians testified against any Indian or their king when it pleased the English, 
that was sufficient. Another grievance was when their kings sold land the English would 
say it was more than they agreed to and a writing must be proof against all of them, and 
some of their kings had done wrong to sell so much that he left his people none, and 
some being given to drunkenness, the English made them drunk and then cheated them in 
bargains, but now their kings were forewarned not to part with land for nothing in 
comparison to the value thereof. Now whomever the English had once owned for king or 
 
Metacom did not take this agreement seriously, for it, in effect, ended the autonomy of his tribe in return for very 
little. 
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queen, they would later disinherit, and make another king that would give or sell them 
their land, that now they had no hopes left to keep any land. Another grievance was that 
the English cattle and horses still increased so that when they removed 30 miles from 
where the English had anything to do, they could not keep their corn from being spoiled, 
they never being used to fence, and thought that when the English bought land of them 
that they would have kept their cattle upon their own land. Another grievance was that 
the English were so eager to sell the Indians liquors that most of the Indians spent all in 
drunkenness and then ravened upon the sober Indians and, they did believe, often did hurt 
the English cattle, and their kings could not prevent it. We knew beforehand that these 
were their grand complaints, but then we only endeavored to persuade them that all 
complaints might be righted without war but could get no other answer but that they had 
not heard of that way for the governor of New York and an Indian king to have the 
hearing of it.”75 
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 John Easton, “A Relation of the Indian War,” pp. 3 – 6. 
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Interview Questions for research into King Philip’s War 
 
The questions will, of course, vary depending on the interviewee and his/her knowledge base i.e. 
is it from an historical perspective, archaeological perspective, or oral tradition. I anticipate 
visiting the Mashantucket Pequot Museum, the Turner Fall Battle Site, The Robbins Museum of 
Archaeology, and the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Museum. In addition, I anticipate discussing 
the Native American perspective with members of the Wampanoag, Mashantucket Pequot, and 
Narragansett tribal groups. 
Some questions: 
 
1. Can you provide me with a brief description of your background as it pertains to the 
study of King Philip’s War? 
 
2. History often tries to identify specific actions that lead to a larger historical event such as 
war. Some narratives place the start of King Philip’s War as June 20, 1675 when a band 
of Pokanoket warriors attacked Swansea. Others suggest the trial and execution of three 
Wampanoag warriors, all said to be associates of Phillip, at Plymouth on June 8, 1675 for 
the murder of John Sassamon, was the catalyst. Do you believe it was either of these 
events or was the path to war already underway? Is there a single event or is it a sum of 
several/many events?  
 
 
3. The Nipmuck, Pocumtuck, and Narragansett Tribes allied under the leadership of Phillip. 
The Mohegan and Mohawk allied with the colonists. Prior to the war the colonial and 
Native American polities were interwoven by trade. Thinking about this, do you see the 
war, at least in part, as a civil war? 
 
4. Recent scholarship and research by historians such as James Axtell, Lisa Brooks, and 
Christine DeLuca, are starting to bring a more ethnologically-based history to the study 
of King Philip’s War. Is this a better way forward, combining the various sides into a 
more singular work? Or should we keep the Native American and colonial narratives 
separate? If so, why? 
 
5. Primary sources, such as William Hubbard’s book, A Narrative of the Troubles with the 
Indians in New-England, published in 1677, and Narrative of the Captivity and 
Restoration of Mrs. Mary Rowlandson, published in 1682, give two often cited sources 
for historical context about the war. What problems do you see in trying to reconstruct 
events from what are perhaps biased sources? 
Or  
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6. Looking at the archaeological record of the war, do you see evidence to support the 
history as it has been written, or do you see discrepancies between what the material 
record seems to tell us and what the written narrative has to say? 
 
7. What artifacts, if any, do you find in more than one location? What do these artifacts tell 
us?  
 
8. Native Americans had been trading with the Europeans since their first arrival in the late 
16th century. One of the things they often traded for were guns. In 1671, King Phillip was 
forced by the colonial government to sign a peace treaty and surrender the arms his 
people had, which, according to the records, Phillip did. What does the archaeological 
record have to say about Native American armaments? Were they using guns? Bow and 
arrow? Perhaps a combination of the two? Does the archaeology suggest an one way or 
another as to whether the 1671 treaty hurt the Native Americans technologically? 
 
9. In your opinion, what are the major take-aways from the conflict? Were Native 
American/Colonial relations harmed irreparably?  
 
10. (Questions I hope to ask specifically to Tribal Historical persons), At what point do you 
feel permanent damage was done to relations between the Europeans and their Native 
American neighbors? Could conflict have been avoided? What would you like to see gain 
more prominence in how the story, and subsequent stories, are told? 
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Appendix II 
Except where noted, all figures and data are from Kevin McBride, David Naumec, Ashley 
Bissonnette, Noah Fellman, University of Connecticut, Technical Report 1676 Battle of Great 
Falls / Wissantinnewag-Peskeompskut Site Identification and Evaluation Project Phase II 
National Park Service American Battlefield Protection Program GA-2287-18-007, Oct. 30, 2020 
National Park Service American Battlefield Protection Program 1849 C Street NW – Room 7228 
Washington, DC 20240 
 
 
  Figure 1. Battle of the English Retreat 
 
 
  Figure 2. Musket ball and horse tack frequency 
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  Figure 3.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Upper and Lower Factory Hollow – the areas circled in red indicate the 
areas where musket balls and horse tack appear together. 
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  Fig. 5 Representation of multi-shot in the barrel 
 
 
Fig. 6 17th century weapons and armor from Plimouth Patuxet collection 
55 
 
 
 
locus Inventory# Period Variety Fragment Treatment Facet? Comments 
F 404 
17th 
century 
musket 
ball 
.53" 
diameter impacted No 
Factory Hollow Road 24 
42.61970000-72.55346167 
round sprue, misshapen, gouges 
F 405 
17th 
century 
musket 
ball 
.53" 
diameter impacted No 
Factory Hollow Road 24 
42.61957833-72.55342833 
round sprue, misshapen, gouges 
F 406 
17th 
century 
musket 
ball 
.53" 
diameter impacted No 
Factory Hollow Road 24 
42.61969000-72.55341500 
round sprue, ricochet, red mineral substance on interior of deep impact - needs analysis 
F 407 
17th 
century 
musket 
ball 
.53" 
diameter impacted No 
Factory Hollow Road 24 
42.61967833-72.55333333 
round sprue, misshapen 
F 408 
17th 
century 
musket 
ball 
.53" 
diameter impacted No 
Factory Hollow Road 24 
42.61971500-72.55335500 
round sprue, misshapen, gouges 
F 409 
17th 
century 
musket 
ball 
.31" 
diameter dropped No 
Factory Hollow Road 24 
42.61977167-72.55342833 
no sprue, impacted 
F 432 
17th 
century 
musket 
ball 
.31" 
diameter impacted No 
Factory Hollow Road 24 
42.61973333-72.55357000 
sprue, gouges, striations 
F 452 
17th 
century 
musket 
ball 
.53" 
diameter impacted No 
Factory Hollow Road 24 
42.62034823-72.55294500 
round sprue, deep cut, ricochet 
F 453 
17th 
century 
musket 
ball 
.52" 
diameter impacted No 
Factory Hollow Road 24 
42.62032167-72.55298667 
F 455 
17th 
century 
musket 
ball 
.45" 
diameter impacted No 
Factory Hollow Road 24 
42.62036000-72.55328333 
With sprue 
F 456 
17th 
century 
musket 
ball 
.53" 
diameter impacted No 
Factory Hollow Road 24 
42.62025000-72.55286333 
With sprue 
F 465 
17th 
century 
musket 
ball 
.53" 
diameter impacted No 
Factory Hollow Road 24 
42.62030667-72.55278333 
misshapen, gouges, striations 
F 467 
17th 
century 
musket 
ball 
.53" 
diameter impacted No 
Factory Hollow Road 24 
42.61936000-72.55357833 
Has sprue, ricochet, embedded quartz 
F 468 
17th 
century 
musket 
ball 
.45" 
diameter impacted No 
Factory Hollow Road 24 
42.61926667-72.55345500 
sprue, misaligned casting seam, firing hemisphere 
F 470 
17th 
century 
musket 
ball 
.35" 
diameter impacted Yes 
Factory Hollow Road 24 
42.61922000-72.55354667 
With sprue and faceted 
F 471 
17th 
century 
musket 
ball 
.53" 
diameter impacted No 
Factory Hollow Road 24 
42.62013000-72.55304333 
sprue, misshapen, gouges 
F 479 
17th 
century 
musket 
ball 
.53" 
diameter impacted No 
Factory Hollow Road 24 
42.62039496-72.55256178 
sprue, misshapen, gouges, ricochet 
F 481 
17th 
century 
musket 
ball 
.53" 
diameter impacted No 
Factory Hollow Road 24 
42.61923833-72.55352333 
misshapen, ricochet 
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F 483 
17th 
century 
musket 
ball 
.33" 
diameter impacted No 
Factory Hollow Road 24 
42.61931500-72.55355500 
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